Fomos enganados e bem enganados.
Enganados quando acreditámos que Tsipras era um homem sério e enganados quando criticámos a oposição constante do KKE, Partido Comunista Grego, ao Syriza.
Neste momento de traição absoluta, não só ao povo grego, mas a todos os povos da Europa, é importante saber que muitos homens e mulheres continuam dispostos a resistir e a lutar contra o fascismo (1), imposto pela Alemanha e aceite, com entusiasmo, pelos colaboracionistas dos diferentes países da EU, a começar pelo de Portugal e a acabar, agora, no da Grécia.
Enganados quando acreditámos que Tsipras era um homem sério e enganados quando criticámos a oposição constante do KKE, Partido Comunista Grego, ao Syriza.
Neste momento de traição absoluta, não só ao povo grego, mas a todos os povos da Europa, é importante saber que muitos homens e mulheres continuam dispostos a resistir e a lutar contra o fascismo (1), imposto pela Alemanha e aceite, com entusiasmo, pelos colaboracionistas dos diferentes países da EU, a começar pelo de Portugal e a acabar, agora, no da Grécia.
De entre alguns elementos do Syriza que
recusaram a humilhação, está o ex-ministro das Finanças, Varoufakis, que se
demitiu e votou contra o acordo de capitulação assinado por Tsipras.
É este acordo ignóbil, para quem o propôs
e para quem o aceitou, que Varoufakis fez questão em publicar e comentar, ponto
por ponto.
Nós traduzimos alguns desses comentários
ao lado do texto original (que pode ser consultado na página web de Varoufakis).
(1) Para
quem julga viver em democracia só porque, de tantos em tantos anos, introduz um
papelinho numa urna de votos, saiba o que, há mais de um século, alguém tão
lúcido como Eça de Queirós disse, pela boca do Conde de Abranhos. “ Eu que sou governo, fraco mas hábil, dou
aparentemente a soberania ao povo, que é forte e simples. Mas, como a falta de
educação o mantém na imbecilidade, e o adormecimento da consciência o amolece
na indiferença, faço-o exercer essa soberania em meu proveito… E quanto ao seu
proveito… adeus, ó compadre!
Ponho-lhe na mão uma espada; e ele, baboso, diz: eu
sou a força! Coloco-lhe no regaço uma bolsa, e ele, inchado, afirma: eu sou a
fazenda! Ponho-lhe diante do nariz um livro, e ele, exclama, de papo: eu sou a lei!
Idiota! Não vê que por trás dele, sou eu, astuto manejador de títeres, quem
move os cordéis que prendem a espada, a bolsa e o livro!”.
E, saiba-se, também, que fascismo é a exploração
extrema de quem trabalha e produz, não sendo necessário que o figurino
apresente sempre um bigodinho, braço estendido ou passo de ganso.
Acordo do
Eurogrupo
The Euro Summit stresses the
crucial need to rebuild trust with the Greek authorities [i.e. the Greek government
must introduce new stringent austerity directed at the weakest Greeks that
have already suffered grossly] as a pre- requisite for a possible future agreement on a new ESM
programme [i.e. for a new
extend-and-pretend loan].
In this context, the
ownership by the Greek authorities is key [i.e. the Syriza government must sign a declaration
of having defected to the troika’s ‘logic’], and successful implementation should follow
policy commitments.
A euro area Member State
requesting financial assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever
possible, a similar request to the IMF This is a precondition for the
Eurogroup to agree on a new ESM programme. Therefore Greece will request
continued IMF support (monitoring and financing) from March 2016 [i.e. Berlin continues to
believe that the Commission cannot be trusted to ‘police’ Europe’s own
‘bailout’ programs].
Given the need to rebuild
trust with Greece, the Euro Summit welcomes the commitments of the Greek
authorities to legislate without delay a first set of measures [i.e. Greece must subject itself to fiscal waterboarding, even before any financing is offered]. These measures, taken in
full prior agreement with the Institutions, will include:
By 15 July
§ the streamlining of the VAT
system [i.e. making it more regressive, through rate rises that encourage
more VAT evasion]and the broadening of the tax base to increase revenue [i.e. dealing a major blow
at the only Greek growth industry – tourism].
§ upfront measures to improve
long-term sustainability of the pension system as part of a comprehensive
pension reform programme [i.e. reducing the lowest of the low of pensions, while ignoring that the
depletion of pension funds’ capital due to the 2012 troika-designed PSI and
the ill effects of low employment & undeclared paid labour].
§ the safeguarding of the full
legal independence of ELSTAT [i.e. the troika demands complete control of the way Greece’s budget
balance is computed, with a view to controlling fully the magnitude of
austerity it imposes on the government.]
§ full implementation of the
relevant provisions of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance
in the Economic and Monetary Union, in particular by making the Fiscal
Council operational before finalizing the MoU and introducing quasi-automatic
spending cuts in case of deviations from ambitious primary surplus targets
after seeking advice from the Fiscal Council and subject to prior approval of
the Institutions [i.e. the Greek government, which knows that the imposed fiscal targets
will never be achieved under the imposed austerity, must commit to further,
automated austerity as a result of the troika’s newest failures.]
By 22 July
§ the adoption of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which is a major overhaul of procedures and arrangements for
the civil justice system and can significantly accelerate the judicial
process and reduce costs [i.e. foreclosures, evictions and liquidation of thousands of homes and
businesses who are not in a position to keep up with their mortgages/loans.]
§ the transposition of the BRRD
with support from the European Commission.
Immediately, and only
subsequent to legal implementation of the first four above-mentioned measures
as well as endorsement of all the commitments included in this document by
the Greek Parliament, verified by the Institutions and the Eurogroup, may a
decision to mandate the Institutions to negotiate a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) be taken [i.e. The Syriza government must be humiliated to the extent that it is
asked to impose harsh austerity upon itself as a first step towards
requesting another toxic bailout loan, of the sort that Syriza became
internationally famous for opposing.]
This decision would be taken
subject to national procedures having been completed and if the preconditions
of Article 13 of the ESM Treaty are met on the basis of the assessment
referred to in Article 13.1. In order to form the basis for a successful
conclusion of the MoU, the Greek offer of reform measures needs to be
seriously strengthened to take into account the strongly deteriorated
economic and fiscal position of the country during the last year [i.e. the Syriza government
must accept the lie that it, and not the asphyxiation tactics of the
creditors, caused the sharp economic deterioration of the past six months –
the victim is being asked to take the blame by the on behalf of the villain.]
The Greek government needs
to formally commit to strengthening their proposals [i.e. to make them more
regressive and more inhuman] in a number of areas identified by the Institutions, with a
satisfactory clear timetable for legislation and implementation, including
structural benchmarks, milestones and quantitative benchmarks, to have
clarity on the direction of policies over the medium-run. They notably need, in agreement with the Institutions, to:
§ carry out ambitious pension
reforms [i.e. cuts] and specify policies to fully compensate for the fiscal
impact of the Constitutional Court ruling on the 2012 pension reform [i.e. cancel the Court’s
decision in favour of pensioners] and to implement the zero deficit clause [i.e. cut by 85% the
secondary pensions that the Syriza government fought tooth and nail to
preserve over the past five months] or mutually agreeable alternative measures [i.e. find ‘equivalent’
victims] by
October 2015;
§ adopt more ambitious product
market reforms with a clear timetable for implementation of all OECD toolkit
I recommendations [i.e. the recommendations that the OECD has now renounced after having
re-designed these reforms in collaboration with the Syriza government], including Sunday trade,
sales periods, pharmacy ownership, milk and bakeries, except over-the-counter
pharmaceutical products, which will be implemented in a next step, as well as
for the opening of macro-critical closed professions (e.g. ferry transportation).
On the follow-up of the OECD toolkit-II, manufacturing needs to be included
in the prior action;
§ on energy markets, proceed
with the privatisation of the electricity transmission network operator
(ADMIE), unless replacement measures can be found that have equivalent effect
on competition, as agreed by the Institutions [i.e. ADMIE will be sold off to specific foreign
vested interests at the behest of the Institutions.]
§ on labour markets, undertake
rigorous reviews and modernisation of collective bargaining [i.e. to make sure that no
collective bargaining is allowed], industrial action [i.e. that must be banned] and, in line with the relevant EU directive and best practice,
collective dismissals [i.e. that should be allowed at the employers’ whim], along the timetable and
the approach agreed with the Institutions [i.e. the Troika decides.]
On the basis of these
reviews, labour market policies should be aligned with international and
European best practices, and should not involve a return to past policy
settings which are not compatible with the goals of promoting sustainable and
inclusive growth [i.e. there should be no mechanisms that waged labour can use to extract
better conditions from employers.]
§ adopt the necessary steps to
strengthen the financial sector, including decisive action on non-performing
loans [i.e. a tsunami
of foreclosures is ante portas] and measures to strengthen governance of the HFSF and the banks [i.e. the Greek people who
maintain the HFSF and the banks will have precisely zero control over the
HFSF and the banks.], in particular by eliminating any possibility for political
interference especially in appointment processes. [i.e. except the political interference of the
Troika.] On top of
that, the Greek authorities shall take the following actions:
§ to develop a significantly
scaled up privatisation programme with improved governance; valuable Greek
assets will be transferred to an independent fund that will monetize the
assets through privatisations and other means [i.e. an East German-like Treuhand is envisaged to
sell off all public property but without the equivalent large investments
that W. Germany put into E. Germany in compensation for the Treuhand
disaster.] The
monetization of the assets will be one source to make the scheduled repayment
of the new loan of ESM and generate over the life of the new loan a targeted
total of EUR 50bn of which EUR 25bn will be used for the repayment of
recapitalization of banks and other assets and 50 % of every remaining euro (i.e.
50% of EUR 25bn) will be used for decreasing the debt to GDP ratio and the
remaining 50 % will be used for investments [i.e. public property will be sold off and the
pitiful sums will go toward servicing an un-serviceable debt – with precisely
nothing left over for public or private investments.] This fund would be established in Greece and
be managed by the Greek authorities under the supervision of the relevant
European Institutions [i.e. it will be nominally in Greece but, just like the HFSF or the Bank
of Greece, it will be controlled fully by the creditors.] In agreement with
Institutions and building on best international practices, a legislative
framework should be adopted to ensure transparent procedures and adequate
asset sale pricing, according to OECD principles and standards on the
management of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) [i.e. the Troika will do what it
likes.]
§ in line with the Greek
government ambitions, to modernise and significantly strengthen the Greek
administration, and to put in place a programme, under the auspices of the
European Commission, for capacity-building and de-politicizing the Greek
administration [i.e. Turning Greece into a democracy-free zone modelled on Brussels, a
form of supposedly technocratic government, which is politically toxic and
macro-economically inept] A first proposal should be provided by 20 July after discussions with
the Institutions. The Greek government commits to reduce further the costs of
the Greek administration [i.e. to reduce the lowest wages while increasing a little the wages some
of the Troika-friendly apparatchiks], in line with a schedule agreed with the Institutions.
§ to fully normalize working
methods with the Institutions, including the necessary work on the ground in
Athens, to improve programme implementation and monitoring [i.e. The Troika strikes back
and demands that the Greek government invite it to return to Athens as
Conqueror – the Carthaginian Peace in all its glory.] The government needs to consult and agree
with the Institutions on all draft legislation in relevant areas with
adequate time before submitting it for public consultation or to
Parliament [i.e. Greek
Parliament must, again, after five months of short-lived independence, become
an appendage of the Troika – passing translated legislation mechanistically.] The Euro Summit stresses
again that implementation is key, and in that context welcomes the intention
of the Greek authorities to request by 20 July support from the Institutions
and Member States for technical assistance, and asks the European Commission
to coordinate this support from Europe;
§ With the exception of the
humanitarian crisis bill, the Greek government will reexamine with a view to
amending legislations that were introduced counter to the February 20 agreement
by backtracking on previous programme commitments or identify clear
compensatory equivalents for the vested rights that were subsequently created
[i.e. In addition
to promising that it will no longer legislative autonomously, the Greek
government will retrospectively annul all Bills it passed over the past five
months.]
The above-listed commitments
are minimum requirements to start the negotiations with the Greek
authorities. However, the Euro Summit made it clear that the start of
negotiations does not preclude any final possible agreement on a new ESM
programme, which will have to be based on a decision on the whole package
(including financing needs, debt sustainability and possible bridge
financing) [i.e. self-flagellate, impose further austerity upon an economy
crushed by austerity, and then we shall see whether the Eurogroup will grave
you with another toxic, unsustainable loans.]
The Euro Summit takes note
of the possible programme financing needs of between EUR 82 and 86bn, as
assessed by the Institutions [i.e. the Eurogroup conjured up a huge number, well above what is
necessary, in order to signal the debt restructuring is out and that debt
bondage ad infinitum is the name of the game.] It invites the Institutions to explore
possibilities to reduce the financing envelope, through an alternative fiscal
path or higher privatisation proceeds [i.e. And, yes, it may possible that pigs will fly.] Restoring market access,
which is an objective of any financial assistance programme, lowers the need
to draw on the total financing envelope [i.e. which is something the creditors will do their
utmost to avoid, e.g. by ensuring that Greece will only enter the ECB’s
quantitative easing program in 2018, once quantitative easing is… over.]
The Euro Summit takes note
of the urgent financing needs of Greece which underline the need for very
swift progress in reaching a decision on a new MoU: these are estimated to
amount to EUR 7bn by 20 July and an additional EUR 5bn by mid August [i.e. Extend and Pretend gets
another spin.] The Euro
Summit acknowledges the importance of ensuring that the Greek sovereign can
clear its arrears to the IMF and to the Bank of Greece and honour its debt
obligations in the coming weeks to create conditions which allow for an
orderly conclusion of the negotiations. The risks of not concluding swiftly
the negotiations remain fully with Greece [i.e. Once more, demanding that the victim takes all
the blame in behalf of the villain.] The Euro Summit invites the Eurogroup to discuss these issues as a
matter of urgency.
Given the acute challenges
of the Greek financial sector, the total envelope of a possible new ESM
programme would have to include the establishment of a buffer of EUR 10 to
25bn for the banking sector in order to address potential bank
recapitalisation needs and resolution costs, of which EUR 10bn would be made
available immediately in a segregated account at the ESM [i.e. the Troika admits that
the 2013-14 recapitalisation of the banks, which would only need a top up of
at most 10 billion, was insufficient – but, of course, blames it on… the
Syriza government.]
The Euro Summit is aware
that a rapid decision on a new programme is a condition to allow banks to
reopen, thus avoiding an increase in the total financing envelope [i.e. The Troika closed
Greece’s banks to force the Syriza government to capitulate and now cries out
for their re-opening.] The ECB/SSM will conduct a comprehensive assessment after the summer.
The overall buffer will cater for possible capital shortfalls following the
comprehensive assessment after the legal framework is applied.
There are serious concerns
regarding the sustainability of Greek debt [N.b. Really? Gosh!] This is due to the easing of policies during
the last twelve months, which resulted in the recent deterioration in the
domestic macroeconomic and financial environment [i.e. It is not the Extend and Pretend ‘bailout’
loans of 2010 and 2012 that, in conjunction with GDP-sapping austerity,
caused the debt to scale immense heights – it was the prospect, and reality,
of a government that criticized the the Extend and Pretend ‘bailout’ loans
that… caused Debt’s Unustainability!]
The Euro Summit recalls that
the euro area Member States have, throughout the last few years, adopted a
remarkable set of measures supporting Greece’s debt sustainability, which
have smoothed Greece’s debt servicing path and reduced costs significantly [i.e. The 1st & 2nd ‘bailout’ programs failed,
the debt skyrocketing as it was always going to since the real purpose of the
‘bailout’ programs was to transfer banking losses to Europe’s taxpayers.] Against this background,
in the context of a possible future ESM programme, and in line with the
spirit of the Eurogroup statement of November 2012 [i.e. a promise of debt restructure to the previous
Greek government was never kept by the creditors], the Eurogroup stands ready to consider, if
necessary, possible additional measures (possible longer grace and payment
periods) aiming at ensuring that gross financing needs remain at a
sustainable level. These measures will be conditional upon full implementation
of the measures to be agreed in a possible new programme and will be
considered after the first positive completion of a review [i.e. Yet again, the Troika
shall let the Greek government labour under un-payable debt and when, as a
result, the program fails, poverty rises further and incomes collapse much
more, then we may haircut some of the debt – as the Troika did in 2012.]
The Euro Summit stresses
that nominal haircuts on the debt cannot be undertaken [N.b. The Syriza government
has been suggesting, since January, a moderate debt restructure, with no
haircuts, maximizing the expected net present value of Greece’s repayments to
creditors’ – which was rejected by the Troika because their aim was, simply,
to humiliate Syriza.] Greek authorities reiterate their unequivocal commitment to honour
their financial obligations to all their creditors fully and in a timely
manner [N.b. Which can
only happen after a substantial debt restrucuture.] Provided that all the necessary conditions
contained in this document are fulfilled, the Eurogroup and ESM Board of
Governors may, in accordance with Article 13.2 of the ESM Treaty, mandate the
Institutions to negotiate a new ESM programme, if the preconditions of
Article 13 of the ESM Treaty are met on the basis of the assessment referred
to in Article 13.1. To help support growth and job creation in Greece (in the
next 3-5 years) [N.b. Having
already destroyed growth and jobs for the past five years…] the Commission will work
closely with the Greek authorities to mobilise up to EUR 35bn (under various
EU programmes) to fund investment and economic activity, including in
SMEs [i.e. Will use
the same order of magnitude of structural funds, plus some fantasy money, as
were available in 2010-2014.] As an exceptional measure and given the unique situation of Greece the
Commission will propose to increase the level of pre-financing by EUR 1bn to
give an immediate boost to investment to be dealt with by the EU
co-legislators [i.e. Of the
headline 35 billion, consider 1 billion as real money.] The Investment Plan for
Europe will also provide funding opportunities for Greece [i.e. the same plan that
most Eurozone ministers of finance refer to as a phantom program].
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Termos da rendição da Grécia
[i.e.,
o governo grego deve instaurar uma austeridade ainda mais rigorosa, atingindo
os cidadãos gregos mais vulneráveis que já sofreram largamente].
[i.e.,
assestar um grande golpe ao único sector grego de crescimento – o turismo.]
[i.e.,
diminuir as mais baixas das pequenas pensões, dando a entender que o
esgotamento dos fundos de pensões não é devido ao PSI, elaborado pela troika
em 2012, com o consequente efeito de baixa do número de empregos e aumento do
trabalho clandestino].
[i.e.,
a troika exige um controlo total sobre a forma como a Grécia elabora o seu
equilíbrio orçamental, com o objectivo de controlar completamente a amplidão
de austeridade que ela impõe ao governo]
[i.e.,
o governo grego, que sabe que os objectivos orçamentais impostos não serão
jamais atingidos com a austeridade imposta, deve comprometer-se com uma
austeridade ainda mais forte e sistemática, resultante dosúltimos erros da
troika]
[i.e.,
o governo Syriza deve ser humilhado, ao ponto de exigirem que imponha, por si
próprio, uma austeridade rigorosa, como prelúdio a um novo pedido de resgate
tóxico, o mesmo cuja rejeição tornou o Syriza internacionalmente célebre]
[i.e.,
o governo Syriza tem de aderir à mentira que faz dele, e não dos credores e
das suas táticas de asfixia, o responsável da forte deterioração da situação
económica no curso dos últimos seis meses – pede-se à vítima que assuma a
culpa do vilão]
[i.e.,
anular a decisão do Tribunal Constitucional favorável aos reformados]
[i.e.,
reduzir em 85% os complementos de reforma, que o governo Syriza havia
defendido, com unhas e dentes, ao longo dos últimos cinco meses]
[i.e.,
ADMIE [rede de distribuição de electricidade] será privatizada para único
benefício de interesses particulares estrangeiros, por ordem das
instituições]
[i.e.,
assegurar-se de que nenhuma negociação colectiva é possível]
[i.e.,
que deve ser proibida [acção sindical]]
[i.e.,
que deve ser submetido aos caprichos dos empregadores [o despedimento
colectivo]]
[i.e.,
não deve existir nenhum mecanismo que permita aos assalariados obter, dos
empregadores, melhores condições]
[i.e.,
anuncia-se um tsunami de penhoras]
[i.e.,
os bens públicos serão liquidados e as magras somas assim obtidas serão
destinadas ao serviço de uma dívida insustentável – sem que nada reste para
investimentos públicos ou privados.]
[i.e.,
fazer da Grécia uma zona livre de democracia, segundo o modelo de Bruxelas,
uma forma de governo supostamente tecnocrático, politicamente tóxico e
macro-economicamente inepto].
[i.e.,
a Troika contra-ataca e exige que o governo grego a convide a regressar a
Atenas como vencedora – a paz cartaginesa em todo o seu esplendor]
[i.e.,
o parlamento grego deve, de novo, após cinco meses de uma breve
independência, tornar-se um apêndice da Troika – aprovar, mecanicamente,
legislação traduzida.]
[i.e.,
além de prometer que não legislará mais de forma autónoma, o governo grego
anulará, retrospectivamente, todas as leis que aprovadas nos últimos cinco
meses.]
[i.e.,
o Eurogrupo tirou da cartola uma soma exorbitante, muito superior ao que é
realmente necessário, para sublinhar que uma reestruturação da dívida está fora
de questão e que o nome do jogo é a servidão eterna da dívida.]
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